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Summary 
National policymakers are increasingly aware that their tax policy options are constrai-
ned by international tax competition. Important features of national tax systems - nota-
bly the tax mix, tax rates and rules which define the tax base - will influence decisions 
of firms and individuals regarding the location and (re)structuring of economic activi-
ties. 
The aim of the present paper is twofold: Firstly, we detail the tax mix of four member 
states of the European Union (Germany, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom). 
Secondly, the paper aims to trace the distribution of the tax burden over rich and poor 
households in these four countries. Although tax mix and tax rates differ considerably 
among the four countries included in the study, the distribution of tax burdens proves to 
be amazingly similar. 
JEL: H24, D30, D31 
Keywords: Distribution of tax burden, European Union; tax mix of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Regierenden eines Landes sind sich zunehmend bewußt, daß ihre steuerpolitischen 
Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten durch internationale Steuerkonkurrenz eingeschränkt wer-
den. Wichtige Eigenschaften der nationalen Steuersysteme - insbesondere zu nennen 
sind hierbei die Steuerstruktur, die Steuersätze und die Steuervorschriften, die die 
Besteuerungsbasis definieren - beeinflussen die Entscheidungen der Firmen und der 
Individuen hinsichtlich der Standorte und (Re)strukturierung der ökonomischen 
Aktivitäten. 
Mit dieser Studie verfolgen wir zwei Ziele: Zuerst gehen wir detailliert auf die Steuer-
zusammensetzung der vier EU-Mitgliedsländer (Deutschland, Niederlande, Spanien und 
Großbritannien) ein. Zweitens wird die Verteilung der Steuerlast über reiche und arme 
Haushalte jeweils für die vier Länder aufgezeigt. Obwohl die Steuerstruktur und die 
Steuersätze zwischen den vier Ländern, die in der Studie betrachtet werden, sehr unter-
schiedlich ausfallen, ist die Steuerlastverteilung der betrachteten Länder erstaunlich 
ähnlich. 
JEL: H24, D30, D31 
Schlagwörter: Verteilung der Steuerlast, Europäische Gemeinschaft, Steuerstruktur 
von Deutschland, den Niederlanden, Spanien und Großbritannien 
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I Introduction 
National policymakers are increasingly aware that their tax policy options are constrained by 
international tax competition. Important features of national tax systems - notably the tax 
mix, tax rates and rules which define the tax base - will influence decisions of firms and 
individuals regarding the location and (re)stnicturing of economic activities. Apart from such 
passive impacts of past and present tax policies, nation states and regions within national 
bouiidaries have demonstrated a keen interest to attract investment and capital through the 
active use of a wide array of tax instruments. Typically, incentives include generous 
specifications of tax deductible costs, accelerated depreciation schenies, reduced tax rates or 
even full 'tax holidays' for a given nwnber of years. 
Traditionally, nominal tax rates - set by lawmakers - get much attention when 
policymakers, opinion leaders and representatives of the business community discuss the 
position of their country in the international tax race. Of Course, tax lawyers and tax 
economists are usually aware that it is effective tax rates that matter most. If high nominal 
rates are applied to a heavily eroded tax base, tlie outcome will be only moderate effective 
rates. There is some irony in the fact that base erosion - which, given budgetary needs, 
pushes up nominal rates - is partly or largely caused by skillful exploitation of existing tax 
incentives. This having been said, it is important to note that on the other hand social, 
psychological and economic impacts of nominal rates may prove to be substantial, because 
many taxpayers do not pierce through the veil of (high) nominal rates. 
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, to detail the tax mix of four member states of 
the European Union, i. e. - in alphabetical order - Germany, the Netherlaiids, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. Together, these countries account for over fifty percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP) of the Union. Secondly, the paper aims to trace the distribution of the tax 
burden over rich and poor households in these four countries. Since no receiit data are readily 
available, our results relate to the situation in the early 1990s and allow conclusions to what 
degree the existing variation in nomiiial rates of major taxes (personal income tax, value 
added tax and social insurance contributions) leads to country-specific patterns of tax 
incidence. Although tax mix and tax rates differ considerably among the four countries 
included in the study, the distribution of tax burdens proves to be amazingly similar. Given 
the ' stickyness' of iiicoine distributioils aild relatively stable iiational tax inixes, our results 
also seem to adequately describe tax distributions as in the mid 1990s. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section I1 introduces the tax system of the four EU member 
states. Next, section I11 discusses the empirical analysis of tax incidence. Section IV, displays 
the incidence of national tax systems. Section V concludes. 
I1 Tax system of four EU member states 
11.1 Introduction 
This section will first present some key demographic and economic data for each nation 
covered by the study. Since the paper analyses tax distributions in the early 1990s, such data 
given here relate to that Same time period. Table 1 compares the size of their populations, and 
GDP per capita in 199 1. Germany had both the largest population and highest per capita 
income (data refer to former West Germany only). Purchasing power per capita in Spain was 
at two-thirds of the German level. 
Table 1 Demographic and economic country profiles, 199 1 
Gernianv") Netherlands S ~ a i n  UK 
Population (X 1 mln) 63.9 15.1 39.0 57.6 
GDP per capita ($) 
- current exchange rates 24,585 19,300 13,510 17,600 
- purchasing power parity 19,500 16,530 12,675 15,720 
- index ppp (Germany = 100) 100 85 6 5 8 1 
a, Data refer to former West Germany only 
Source: OECD, 1993a, pp. 6-7,24-2s1 
Table 2 compares the role of the public sector. In 199 1, total public speiiding amounted to 
between 40.2 (UK) and 55.2 percent (Netherlands) of GDP. International comparisons of 
spending levels must be interpreted with care, because the role of off-budget items and tax 
expenditures may greatly vary from one country to another (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (oEcD)).~ 
Table 2 Public sector, 1991 (% of GDP) 
Germany Netherlands Spain UK 
Total outlays 49.2 55.2 45.0 40.2 
Current receipts 
Deficit 
Gross public debt 45.0 78.3 45.5 40.4 
Source: EC, 19933 
By the early 1990s, all countries ran deficits, because current public receipts fell short of 
outlays. In 1991 Spain showed the largest gap between public outlays and current receipts. At 
OECD, Economic Outlook, 54, Paris, 1993a. 
OECD, 'The role of the Public Sector', OECD Economic Studies (4), Paris, 1985, pp. 27-90 
OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-1992. Paris, 1993b. 
the time, the Netherlands boasted the smallest deficit, but on the other hand it had the largest 
public debt in terrns of Gross Domestic Product. 
Ratios of total tax revenue to GDP display much diversity arnong EU member states. 
Moreover, country positions may strongly vary according to the taxes which are taken into 
account. This is especially important as regards the inclusion or the exclusion of compulsory 
social insurance contributions. For example, excluding such contributions, in 1990 the tax 
level in the Netherlands was below the EU average. Including social insurance contributions, 
tlie Netherlands had one of the highest tax levels in the whole EU area. We reckon social 
iiisurance contributions as taxes here. 
Table 3 shows the ranking of the four countries by their tax-to-GDP ratios. The tax structure 
of any country may be characterised by the relative shares of various types of taxes. In 
addition to total tax levels, table 3 displays the tax mix. In Germany, the Netherlands and 
Spain social insurance contributioiis are the single most important source of public revenue. 
In the UK they remain far behind. Receipts from this source vary strongly among countries, 
reflecting varying degrees of coverage and generosity of programmes, as well as different 
methods of financing social security traiisfers. 
Table 3 Tax mix of selected EU Member States, 1991 (% GDP)~) 
Personal Corporate Property Consump- Social Total 
income income tion insurance taxes 
contributions 
Netherlands 12.3 3.4 1.7 11.9 17.4 47.0 
Germany 10.6 1.7 1.1 10.5 15.3 39.2 
United Kiiigdom 10.3 3.2 3 .O 11.8 6.4 36.0 
Spain 8.1 2.7 1.8 9.8 12.3 34.7 
EU average 10.9 3 .O 1.9 12.9 11.9 41.2 
a, Countries rariked by decreasing tax-toGDP ralio. 
Source: OECD, 1993b, pp. 75-86 
Only in the Netherlands the share of personal income tax revenues exceeds the EU average. In 
Germany lhe shäre of the corporate income tax is below average. In relative terms, property is 
heavily taxed in the United Kingdom. Iii Spain, consumption and personal income are taxed 
relatively moderately. 
11.2 Germany 
Germany finances its public expenditures out of tax revenues and through social 
contributions. The personal income tax constitutes tlie single most important source of public 
revenue. In the FRG it consists of a wage withholding tax and the income tax proper. Table 4 
shows that over the period 1980- 1992 the shase of the income tax lias vasied between 23% 
and nearly 26% of total revenue from taxes and contrib~tions.~ Another important tax is the 
value-added tax (including the import tumover tax) with a tax shase of about 15%. Various 
duties and consumption taxes, including the mineral oil tax and tobacco taxes, are included in 
table 4 as 'other taxes'. In recent yeass their share increased fiom 8% (1990) to 10% (1992). 
The national social insurance system, which includes old age pensions, health insurance, 
disability and unemployment insurance, is financed by both employers and employees. The 
share of employer contributions in the tax mix has slightly decreased, to 18.5% in 1992, 
whereas the share of employee contributions increased from 1 8% (1 980) to more than 2 1 % 
(1 992). 
It is remarkable, that whereas total revenue from taxes and contributions has doubled after 
1980 (from 580 bn to 1160 bn Dmarks in 1992), the structure of the tax mix has only 
masginally changed over the past fifteen yeass. 
Table 4 Tax mix of Gesmany, 1980-1992 (% share) 
Personal income tax 25.6 23.8 23.0 23.1 23.5 273 
Employee social insurance 17.9 22.0 22.5 21.5 21.2 246 
Employer social insuraiice 19.1 18.9 19.2 18.8 18.5 215 
Value-added tax 16.1 14.8 15.9 16.4 16.5 192 
Other taxes 8.7 8.3 8.2 9.9 10.0 116 
Local government taxes 8.9 7.9 8.0 7.4 7.5 87 
Corporate income tax 3.7 4.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Total revenue (DM bn) 580 740 930 1064 1161 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch, various issues 
4 Information given in table 4 is only available for the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 
with the exception of data on municipal, federal and trade taxes, which as from 1991 include tliose of 
the five new states (Länder). 
11.3 Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, public outlays are over three-quarters financed out of taxes and social 
insurance contrib~itions. Non-tax revenues and new debt bridge the gap that remains. In 1992 
total tax revenues amounted to Gld 267bn (table 5), which roughly equalled 48% of GDP. In 
addition to Gld 162 bn in central and local government taxes, contributions to finance public 
social insurance programmes constitute a very important source of revenue to the public 
sector (Gld 105 bn). 
The personal iiicome tax and contributions to finance the general social insurances dominate 
the tax system, each accounting for about one-quarter of total tax revenues. Less than 10% of 
income tax due is collected by assessment, the remainder being collected by withholding the 
tax at source, the latter method being applied to wages, private pensions, social insurance and 
welfare benefits (wage tax), and dividends (dividend tax). Resident tax-payers are taxed on 
their world-wide income, that has been earned within a given calendar year. As a mle, private 
capital gains are not taxed. Income is taxed under a three-bracket rate schedule at 13%, 50% 
and 60%, respectively. Households with a net worth over (roughly) Gld 200,000 and over are 
liable to a net wealth tax (rate 0.8%). Revenues from this net wealth tax arnount to Gld 1.4 
bn. 
In 1991, contributions to finance general social insurances produced nearly Gld 63 bn. All 
residents are covered by four general social inswance Programmes, the most important one 
being the general old-age pension scheme. Contributions to finance the general social 
insurances have a flat rate (25%), with a cap, since these taxes are due on income in the first 
income tax bracket only, while the personal exemptions apply. Thus, the combined rate of the 
personal income tax and general social insurance contributions Comes to (1 3+25=) 3896, 50% 
and 60% respectively. 
Value-added tax and contributions to finance the employee social insurances each raise over 
Gld 40 bn. Participation in the employee social insurances is mandatory for all workers in the 
market sector. Insured workers are entitled to benefits in case of unemployment, sickness and 
disability. The tax basis is gross wage. Part of this flat rate tax is withheld from employee 
wages, part is directly paid by employers. The maximum amount of eariiings subject to 
contributions for employee social insurances is about Gld 75,000 (1 992). 
Over the whole 1980-1 992 period, the tax mix in tlie Netherlands has not fundamentally 
changed. However, the share of the personal income tax and employee social insurance 
contributions has somewhat declined, whereas the share of general social insurance 
contributions and local plus green taxes increased by several points. 
Table 5 Tax mix of the Netherlands, 1 980- 1992 (% share) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 Gld bn 
Personal iiicome tax 
General social insurance 
Employee social insurance 
Value-added tax 
Other taxes 
Corporate income tax 
Excise taxes 
Local and green taxes 
Total 
Total revenue (Gld bn) 156 192 231 256 267 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, various publications 
11.4 Spain 
The present Spanish tax system has its origin in the Tax Reform of 1977 which introduced for 
the first time a veritable personal income tax, together with a net wealth tax. The present top 
rate of the income tax is 56%. Up till now, the wealth tax has not beeil very effective in 
reducing the share in national income of the most affluent individuals. 
The corporation income tax was reformed in 1978. The taxation of goods and services 
underwent important changes in the wake of the 1986 reform of most indirect taxes, which 
was motivated by the entry of Spain into the former EC. Particularly, the introduction of the 
value-added tax should be mentioned. The share of import taxes has dramatically dropped, 
also as a consequence of Spain joining tlie European Union. 
Table 6 Tax mix of Spain, 1980- 1992 (% share) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 Pst bn 
Social insurance contributions 
Personal income tax 
Value-added tax 
Other indirect taxes 
Corporate income tax 
Other direct taxes 
Wealth tax 
Customs duties 
Capital tax 
Total 
Total revenue (Pst bn) 3908 8462 17221 18767 20990 
Source: Bmco de Espaiia, National Accounts 
In Spain, social insurance contributions are the single most important revenue source of the 
public sector. The share of contributions in the tax mix fell during the first half of the 1980s 
and remained more or less stable as froni the mid 1980s. Still, social insurance contributions 
made up over one-third of total tax revenue in 1992. The second most important tax source is 
the personal income tax, producing one-fourth of total revenue in 1992. The share of the 
personal income tax in GDP has significantly expanded, as a consequence of progressive rate 
iiicreases and a marked growth in the number of persons reporting their income to the tax 
authorities. Given major changes in the structure of indirect taxation, the share of taxes on 
coiisumption (value-added tax and other indirect taxes) has remained remarkably stable over 
the 1980- 1992 period, revenue fiom these sources amounting to over one-fourth of total tax 
proceeds. The share of the corporate income tax was rather volatile, with a clear peak in 1990. 
11.5 United Kingdom 
In 1992, UK general governrnent receipts froni taxation amounted to £2 10 bn, some 3 5% of 
GDP. In teriiis of reveilue raised, tlie inost iniportant UK tax is personal income tax which 
generated 27% of total tax revenue in 1992. The other major UK taxes are National insurance 
(the UK social sec~u-ity tax), value-added tax, corporation income tax and excise duties. 
Together, these taxes produce over four-fifth of total UK tax revenues. 
The income tax has tlxee rates of 20%, 25% and 40%, respectively. Every individual is 
entitled to a personal allowance, which varies according to marital status and age. For roughly 
three-quarters of taxpayers, the 25% rate is their marginal rate of tax. Income tax is levied on 
an annual basis. The vast majority of revenue is collected by withholding the tax at source, 
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eitlier by employers or by banks in the case of interest income and mortgage relief (MIRAS). 
The social security tax, National insurance, is also levied on cuwent income of employees 
and the self-employed. National insurance was levied at a rate of 9%, up to a ceiling of 
£21,840 gross income in 1993-94. Employers must also pay National insurance with a main 
contributions rate of 10.4% and no cap. 
Value-added tax was introduced in 1973 when the UK entered the former EC. Since 1991 it 
has been levied at a standard rate of 17.5%. Roughly three-fifth of consLimer spending is on 
goods that fall into the standard rate category, the major exceptions being food, children's 
clothing, books and newspapers and transport. Many basic necessities are taxed at Zero rates. 
Excise duties - on beer, cider, wine, spirits, tobacco, petrol and vehicles - raise significant 
Sums in the UK. In 1992 their revenue amounted to 70% of the proceeds from VAT. 
Over the last fifteen years, the UK tax mix has changed substantially, due to both ecoiiomic 
fluctuations and policy changes. The level of profits in the economy accounts for the 
changing importance of the corporation tax, while increasiiig personal incomes over tlie 
1980s kept inconie tax revenues very buoyant, despite significant reductions in tax rates in the 
late 1980s. The most significant policy change has been the gradually expanding role of tlie 
value-added tax, as the standard rate rose from 8% in 19'79 to 17.5% in fiscal year 1993-94. 
Table 7 Tax mix of the United Kingdom, 1980-1 992 (% share) 
Personal income tax 
Value-added tax 
National insurance 
Excise duties 
Corporation tax 
Business ratesa) 
Other receipts 
Local personal taxesa 
Capital taxes 
Customs duties 
Total 
Total revenue f& bn) 84 137 203 208 210 
a, Local personal taxes in 1980 includes business rates, as they were not separately identified for this year. 
Source: Financial Statistics, Financial Statement und Budget Report, und Economic Trends Annual Supplement, various issues 
I11 Empirical analysis of tax incidence 
111.1 Introduction 
The incidence of a tax is measwed by the reduction in real income that results from the 
imposition of that tax. Taxes may reduce the income of individuals as producers; or they may 
increase the prices of consumer goods and thus reduce the purchasing power of a given 
money income. Both effects will be charted here. However, no attempt is made to measure 
the burden that results from the reallocation of resources or the changes in consumption 
pattems that may be caused by taxation. 
We want to establish who pays the taxes (statutory incidence) and who ultimately bears the 
tax burden (economic incidence). Both tax distributions will differ, since individuals and 
firms are iiiclined to shift taxes they must pay onto others. Although some Progress has been 
made in recent years in improving the methodology of tax analysis, economists still disagree 
about the economic incidence of several of the most important taxes in the tax system. Given 
the state of the art, estimates of economic incidence will usually be based on a set of 
incidence assumptions. Once the statutory incidence of taxes has been established, their 
economic incidence may be traced under a variety of such assumptions. 
To measure tax distributions, most economists will start to identify relevant income units, 
usually households or famil ie~.~ Then, many would prefer to employ a general equilibrium 
model to calculate the present value of tax burdens imposed upon each household over its 
lifetime. This burden would be compared to the households lifetime income. Recent work of 
Fullerton and Rogers6 stands as an example of the proper way to implen~ent his 
methodology. 
However, economists who work in the policy arena usually do not follow this "lifetime 
approach"7 (Barthold, 1993). Employing various methodologies, government organisations 
and policy advisors typically implement some form of "annual approach" . This approach, 
pioneered by Pechman,8 estimates the distribution of tax burdens in a given year. For all kind 
of practical reasons the annual approach will also be taken in this Paper, although some 
economists would maintain the theoretical superiority of the lifetime approach. 
Subsections 111.2 and 111.3 explore the 'Pechman approach' in greater detail and specify our 
shifting ass~imptions. 
5 Household definitions may vary from one country to  another. 
Fullerton and Rogers, Who Bears The Lefetime Tax Burden?, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 
1993. 
Barthold, 'How Should We Measure Distribution?', National Tax Journal, XLVI, pp. 291-299 (1993). 
Pechmann, Who Paid The Taxes, 1965- 1985, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1985. 
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111.2 Statutory incidence of taxes 
Individuals pay taxes on tlie income they earn and on benefits received from the public 
s e ~ t o r . ~  When spending their income on goods and services, given prices will usually include 
one or more taxes, such as value-added tax, excises and import duties. To establish how much 
tax an individual household actually pays in income and consumption taxes, any of two roads 
may be followed. 
First, the necessary data may directly come from government or private administrations. As 
an example, the amount of personal income tax paid by households can be taken from the 
records of the tax administration. However, in most cases researchers have no access to data 
from governrnent administrations. The other route for them to follow is to ask individuals or 
private firms how much they pay in specific taxes. As an example, researchers may organise a 
survey and ask a representative sample of the population how much they paid in personal 
income tax or wealth tax in the previous year. In most cases, however, surveys do not contain 
explicit questions about aniounts of taxes paid. Moreover, in many cases individuals are not 
aware how much they pay in consumption taxes because in Europe, typically, such taxes are 
not separately identified on sales slips. 
Still, given the necessary income and consurnption data of households, the amounts paid iii 
income and consumptioii taxes can be calculated, using a microanalytic model. Techniques 
available to microsimulate tax burdens of individual households are discussed in, among 
others, Orcutt et a1.,10 Brunner and Petersen,ll and Harding12. Separate modules of such 
micromodels calculate personal income tax, and social insurance contributions due, given the 
income of each household in a representative sample, and taking account of its relevant socio- 
economic and demographic household characteristics. For example, the amount of personal 
income tax due will - apart from income - also depend on marital status and niay vary with 
the nuniber of children in the household. Also, provided the data set contains the relevant 
information, deductions and exempted income can be taken into account when simulating the 
amount of income tax due. If social insurance contributions are deductible for income tax 
purposes, the model first simulates contributioiis due. Next, this aniount is deducted in 
simulating the income tax due. 
Likewise, the burden of value-added tax, excises and import duties can be estimated for each 
individual household in a representative sample, by applying relevant tax rates to all items 
consuined as known from survey data. 
It may be noted that many couiltries teild to exeiript certaii~ benefits from iilcome taxation. 
l0 Orcutt, Merz and Quinke (eds.), Microanalytic Models to Support Social and Fiilancial Policy, North- 
Holland, Amsterdam, 1986. 
Brunner and Petersen (eds.) Prospects and Limits of Simulation Models in Tax and Tranfer Policy, Campus, 
Frankfurt/New York, 1990. 
l2 Harding (ed.), Microsimulation and Public Policy, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 1996. 
11 
To surnmarize, to establish who pays how much in taxes, researchers may: 
- take tax amounts as registered in government or private administrations; 
- use tax amounts as reported in household surveys; 
- allocate taxes in proportion to other items known from administrations or surveys (for 
example, food consumption); 
- microsimulate tax aniounts, using relevant information fiom administrations or surveys. 
The final column of tables 10 through 13, which detail tax incidence in eacli of the four 
Member States, indicates for each tax how its statutory incideiice has been established. 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that the availability of adequate data for a 
representative sample of households is essential to establish who pays the taxes. 
For each household in the sample the files must contain data on income from various sources, 
and also demographic and other economic information, such as the age of household 
members, the consumption on goods and services, home ownership, and so On. In case the 
necessary microdata are not or only partially available in one and the Same dataset, tax 
researchers may combine data from two or more sources (administrations, surveys). 
If no tax and household data are available from administrations or representative surveys 
among the population, tax researchers might also take recourse to an analysis of the tax 
burden of a few selected representative economic agents, for example a low, medium and 
high income household witli given socio-economic and demographic status, and calculate the 
statutory incidence of personal income tax and employee social insurance contributions, 
applying standard tax deductions only. This approach underlies calculations of the taxlbenefit 
position of production workers that are annually published by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development13. Likewise, the burden of consumption taxes may be 
estimated by analyzing data - from budget surveys, and national accounts - for a few 
consumer households deemed to be sufficiently representative for the population as a whole. 
We will not report on tax burdens of such representative households, because fortunately rich 
datasets are available which allow to trace taxes actually paid by a representative sample from 
the total population. 
111.3 Economic incidence of taxes 
We have already remarked that, in order to determiiie who bears the tax burden, it is 
necessary to consider how different taxes may be shifted fiom some individuals onto others. 
Studies which try to trace the economic iiicidence of taxes by income class must include a set 
l 3  OECD, The Tax-Benefit Position Workers, 1992-1995, Paris, 1996. 
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of assumptions about the incidence of major taxes. Following Pechman14 we have selected a 
Set of rather eclectic incidence assumptions which underpin the results to be presented in 
section IV. 
A. Personal income tax (including wage tax) and net wealth tax are assumed not to be 
shifted and are thus borne by those who pay these taxes. 
B. Value-added tax, excises, import duties, agricultural levies and the car tax are assumed to 
be borne by consumers of the taxed comrnodities in proportion to their consumption of taxed 
items. 
C. Social insurance contributions paid by workers, self-employed and benefit recipients are 
assumed to be borne by them. 
D. Social insurance contributions imposed on employers are assumed to be shifted for three- 
quarters to employees, and for one-quarter to consumers. 
E. Corporation income tax (plus dividend tax) is allocated one-third to shareholders, one- 
third to property income in general and one-third to consumers. 
F. Property tax on commercial and industrial buildings is assumed to be shifted to 
consumers; the property tax on houses is borne by renters and owner-occupiers respectively.15 
Results presented here of Course critically depend on this set of assumptions. However, our 
results do not change very much if alternative plausible sets of assumptions are adopted. In 
his pathbreaking study, Pechmanl6 used nine separate sets of incidence assumptions. In each 
case, however, assumptions A, B and C were taken to apply. Pechman used alternative 
assumptions to trace the economic incidence of corporation income tax, property taxes and 
social insurance contributions levied from employers. Because these taxes have no dominant 
role in most national tax mixes, it follows that the combined incidence of all taxes remains 
more or less stable, regardless of the alternative shifting assumptions adopted. 
Our incidence assumptions may also be compared to the shifting of taxes which is embodied 
in 'behavioural equations' that are part of widely used niacroeconometric models. Tliere are a 
great many of such models, which are typically employed to analyse the short and medium 
l4 Pechmann, Who Paid the Taxes, 1965-1985, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1985. pp. 23-41. 
15 As to assumption C, it niight be remarked that as employer social insurance contrib~itions increase 
the gap between the producer price and the consumer price of labour, they are not different in 
incideiice from ernployee social insurance contributions. Hence, it might alternatively be assumed 
that the burden would fully be shifted to employees, and not for only 314. 
As to assumptions D (and E) the following observation seems to be in order. Given efficient capital 
markets, sliare prices will change so as to equalise rates of return taking into account existing 
corporate tax regimes. For this reason, corporate taxes are not only paid by shareholders. It is most 
likely, that instead corporate taxes are borne in part by consumers and labour, the exact mix 
depending partly on the proportion of products that is exported. However, the incidence assumptions 
cliosen here more closely reflect an 'average' of Pechman's approach. 
l6  Pechmann, Who Paid the Taxes, 1965-1985, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1985, P. 35. 
13 
term inipacts of various policy measures, including effects of chaiiges in tax rates. However, 
macroeconometric models are less suited to estimate the long term economic incidence of 
taxes, which is exactly the topic of this Paper. 
IV Incidence of national tax systems 
IV.l Introduction 
This section estimates and discusses distributions of statutory and economic tax burdens in 
four selected meniber states of the European Union. Tax incidence will be estimated for some 
year in the early 1990s, using recent microdata for representative samples of households. It 
should be stressed that only this micro approach allows distributional analyses as presented 
here. 
Given the limitations inherent to available microdata, it was not possible to calculate the 
burden of all taxes. Taxes covered in this report range from between 62% of total taxes for 
Germany to 98% of all taxes for the Netherlands (table 8). Also, the base year is not exactly 
the Same for countries included in our analysis. Given the small spread in the base year 
(1 989-1993)17 and the generally observed relative stability of tax structures and income 
distributions over limited time periods, results presented here still allow comparison of the 
distribution of tax burdens in the four EU member states under consideration. 
Table 8 Taxes covered and datasets used 
taxes covered (%', dataset vear 
Germany 62 German Socio Economic Panel 
Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 
Netherlands 9 8 Panel Survey of Income 199 1 
Consurner Survey 1992 
Housing Demand Survey 1989 
Spain 9 3 Family Expenditure Survey 1990 
United Kingdom 94 Family Expenditure Survey 1993 
To calculate tax distributions, a four-step procedure will be followed. 
First, for each country olle or more representative samples with household data have been 
selected. In their characteristics the households in these samples closely mirror the population 
at large. 
Second, the taxes each household in the sample pays have to be determined. It will be 
l7 The German EvS (1983) is tlie exception here. 
recalled from subsectioii 111.2 that the amo~mt of taxes households pay niay be traced in either 
of three ways. Sometimes information about taxes paid is directly available in the dataset 
(from an administration or survey). In other cases taxes paid have been simulated, for 
example by combining consumption data and statutory VAT-rates. Also, given income 
components and household composition, levies on income may be simulated with a 
microanalytic model. 
The final column of tables 9 through 12, which detail tax incidence in each of the four 
member states, contains a code, which indicates for each tax how its statutory incidence has 
been established: 
ADM - tax amount as registered in govemment or private administrations; or 
- taxes allocated in proportion to other items from administrations (for example, 
dividend income); 
SUR - tax amount as reported in household surveys; or 
- taxes allocated in proportion to other items from surveys (for example, food 
consumption); 
SIM- tax arnount has been simulated, using relevant information from administrations or 
surveys. 
Once taxes paid by each household have been determined, as a third step, all households are 
raizked in ten 10%-groups - conimonly called 'deciles' - by increasing income. The first decile 
contains the 10% of households with lowest incomes, the tenth decile comprises the 10% of 
households with highest incomes. 
In the fourth step, the share of (households in) each decile in the total revenue from each 
separate tax is established. The combined economic incidence of all taxes is then found by 
weighing distributions of individual taxes over deciles by their share in total revenue 
collected. 
Apart from potential weaknesses embodied in our shifting assumptions, a further caveat 
applies. For technical reasons the crucial concepts of 'household' and 'income' may differ 
between countries. Such differences and their potential consequences are more fully 
examiiied in the paper commissioned by the ~u1Directorate-General of Budgets, which is 
available from the Coniiiiission of tlie EU at request. 
IV.2 Germany 
Table 9 shows the economic incidence of 62% of all taxes levied in Germany (distribution of 
tax shares by decile). The results obtaiiied are based on survey data for 1983 (value-added 
tax)" and for 1990 (all other taxes). Given available data, the incidence of only three niajor 
taxes could be traced: the personal income tax, value-added tax and employee social 
insurance contributions. Given the three taxes included in the analysis and the composition of 
the German tax mix vis-a-vis the tax mix of the other three member states, there is no reason 
to expect a priori a fundamentally different pattern of tax incidence between countries 
considered here. Moreover, customs duties and agricultural levies have been apportioiied to 
households proportional to total consumption and food consumption, respectively. 
From table 9 it can be concluded that in the early 1990s the top decile paid slightly over one- 
quarter of all taxes covered. The next 40% of households generated 50% of total tax revenue, 
while the bottom half of the distribution contributed only one-quarter of all taxes. Given the 
tax base and rate structure of levies not included in the analysis, one might assume that the 
distribution of all taxes is less skewed to deciles with higher ranking numbers. 
Table 9 Distribution of tax shares, Germany (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Total Sharea) Code 
Personal income tax 
Employee social 
insurance contributions 
Value-added tax 
Customs duties 
Agricultural levies 
Total all taxes 
Memorandum items 
Gross personal iiicome 
Net personal income 
Coiisumption 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
SUR~) 
SUK' 
SUR 
SUR 
SUR 
a, Share (%) in tax mix (1992). 
b, Tax <hart: cnrrrcpnnds with s h a r ~  of each dccilc in nggregntc household consumplion. 
Tax share corresponds with share of each decile in aggregate food consumption. 
18 Altliougli consumption data refer to 1983, their use seems to be admissible, given the stability of 
consuinption pattenls and the structure of V A T - ~ ~ ~ S .  
Distributions of taxes paid by households in different deciles can present a misleading picture 
of the progressivity of the tax system, because such a presentation takes no account of the 
different income level in each decile. Therefore, Chart 1 also shows taxes paid by households 
in each decile as a proportion of gvoss personal income in that decile. This average tax burden 
is basically the economic incidence of all taxes included in the analysis, given our shifting 
assumptions. l 9  
The distribution of the tax burden is remarkably flat, except for households ranked in the 
first decile. Clearly, regressive social insurance contributions largely outweigh the progressive 
personal income tax rate. 
Chart 7.1 Average tax burden, Gemany 
Taxes* paid as a proportion of gross personal income, per decile 
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* Only personal income tax and employee social insurance contributions are included in this chart. 
19 It should be noted that only persoiial income tax and employee social insurance contributions 
are included in cliart 1. 
IV.3 Netherlands 
Table 10 shows the economic incidence of 98% of all taxes levied in the Netherlands 
(distribution of tax shares by decile). These results are based on data from the tax 
administration and on survey data for 1989, 1991 and 1992, respectively. In the early 1990s 
the top decile paid one-quarter of all taxes covered, the next 30% of households contributed 
40% of total tax revenue, while the bottom half of the distribution generated 24% of all taxes. 
The personal income tax and net wealth tax are clearly the most progressive levies. On the 
other hand, the local waste management tax - a user fee - is distributed over deciles nearly 
proportionally. 
In the preceding sectioii it has already been pointed out that distributions of taxes paid by 
households in different deciles can present a misleading picture of the progressivity of the tax 
system, because such a presentation takes no account of the different income level in each 
decile. Therefore, Chart 2 shows total tax paid by households in each decile as a proportion of 
aggregate gross household income in that decile. On average, households in the Netherlands 
hand over 60% of their gross income to the t a~man.~ '  The top two deciles pay only a few 
percentage points more. The bottom two deciles clearly experience somewhat lighter tax 
burdeiis, which makes the total distribution of tax burdens slightly progressive. Still, eveii the 
poorest households on average contribute nearly half of their gross income to the fisc. 
20 Taxes in the Netherlands amount to 48% of GDP, and absorb 60% of aggregate gross income of 
private households. Various factors may explain the differeilce. Mainly, value added tax (over 6% of 
GDP), retained corporate profits (around 4% of GDP) and investment income of pension funds (some 
6% of GDP) are alle included in GDP, but none of these components is received as current income by 
private liouseholds. 
Table 10 Distribution of tax shares, the Netherlands (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Total Sharea) Code 
Personal income tax 
Value-added tax 
Corporate income taxb) 
Excise duties 
Motor vehicle tax 
Special tax on cars 
Customs dutiesc) 
Green energy taxes 
Net wealth tax 
Agricultural leviese) 
Local property taxes 
Local waste man. tax 
Local sewer tax 
General social 
insurance contributions 
Employee social 
insurance contributions 
- employees 
- employers 
ADM 
SIM 
ADMISUR 
SUR 
SUR 
SIM 
SUR 
SIM 
ADM 
SUR 
SURISIM 
SUR 
SUR 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
Total all taxes 2 3 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 25 100 98.1 
Memorandum items 
Gross household income 3 4 5 7 8 10 11 13 15 24 100 ADM 
Net household income 3 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 22 100 ADMISUR 
Labour income 1 1 3 5 8 10 13 15 19 25 100 ADM 
Property income 2 2 3 5 7 9 10 13 17 33 100 ADM 
Dividend income 2 0 1 1 2 4 7 10 16 57 100 ADM 
Consumption 5 5 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 18 100 SUR 
ii Share (%) in tax mix (1992). 
Includes dividend witliholding tax. $ Tax share corresponds with sliare of eacli decile in aggregate houieliold consumption. 
Tlie specific distribution of the Dutch wealth tax is a direct consequence of current taxplanning practice. Several thousands of the most 
wealthy taxpayers have no (taxable) income and are therefore ranked in the first decile. Taxpayers with Zero taxable income get a refund of 
v a l t h  tax. Houseliolds concerned cover their costs of living through loans and tax-exempt capital gains. 
Tax sliare corresponds with share of eacli decile in aggregate food consumption. 
Chart 7.2 Average tax burden, Netherlands, 1991 -1992 
Taxes* paid as a proportion of gross personal income, per decile 
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only personal income tax and employee insurance contributions are included in ths chart. 
IV.4 Spain 
Table 11 shows the economic incidence of 93% of all taxes levied in Spain (distribution of 
tax shares by decile). These results are based on survey data for 1990. In that year 26% of all 
taxes covered were paid by the top decile, and 50% by the next 40% of households, while the 
bottom half of the distribution contributed 23% of total tax revenue. Similar to the case of the 
Netherlands, the personal income tax and net wealth tax are clearly the most progressive 
l e ~ i e s . ~ ~  The corporate income tax and consumption taxes are much more evenly spread over 
deciles. 
Chart 3 illustrates the average burden of all taxes included in table 11. On average, 
households in Spain hand over 53% of their gross income to the taxrnan. The top two deciles 
pay only two points more. The bottom three deciles experience somewhat lighter tax burdens, 
which makes the over-all distribution of taxes slightly progressive. 
It might be noted tliat in the case of Spain the wealth tax has been fully allocated to the tenth decile, 
not on the basis of survey data but based on statistical data as published by the Administration. 
2 0 
Table 11 Distribution of tax shares, Spain (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total sharea) Code 
Personal income tax 0 0 2 3 5 7 10 14 19 41 100 25.0 
Net wealth tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 1.1 
Corporate tax 4 5 6 7 9 8 10 10 14 27 100 6.8 
Other direct taxes 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 19 100 1.6 
Social insurance taxes 
- employer 2 3 5 7 8 11 12 15 17 21 100 25.6 
- employee 1 2 4 6 8 9 12 15 19 25 100 10.4 
Value-added tax 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 18 100 14.7 
Excise duties 2 4 6 8 9 11 12 14 15 18 1 0 0 6 . 8  
Customs dutiesb) 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 18 100 0.8 
Agricultural leviesc) 5 7 8 10 10 11 11 12 12 14 100 0.1 
SIM 
SIM 
SUR 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
SUR 
SUR 
SUR 
Total all taxes 2 3 4 6 8 9 11 14 16 26 100 92.7 
Memorandum items 
Gross household inc. 2 4 5 6 8 9 11 13 16 27 100 SUR 
Nethouseholdincome 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 13 15 24 100 SUR 
Labour income 0 1 4 6 8 10 12 16 17 26 100 SUR 
Property income 3 5 5 6 8 8 10 10 15 30 100 SUR 
Dividend incomed) 1 3  3 4 7 5 8 7 1 6 4 5 1 0 0  SUR 
Consumption 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 19 100 SUR 
a, Share (%) in tax mix (1992). 
b, Tax share corresponds with share of each decile in aggregate household consuinption. 
C) Tax share corresponds with share of each decile in aggregate food consumption. 
*) Includes interest. 
Chart 7.3 Average tax burden, Spain, 1990 
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V.5 United Kingdom 
Table 12 shows the distribution of tax shares of nearly 94% of all taxes paid in the UK based 
on survey data for 1 993.22 The table shows tliat the top decile pays over 30% of taxes covered, 
the next 40% of households generate slightly over 50% of total tax revenues, while the 
bottom half of the income distribution contribute only 17%. 
The UK Income Tax, being the most progressive tax, is skewed very strongly to richer 
households, nearly half of its revenue is paid by the top decile alone. The tax share paid by 
the top deciles is also relatively high for Social Secwity taxes (National Insurance) and VAT. 
National Insurance paid by employers is more progressive because there is no ceiling on 
payments. In comparison, other UK taxes and especially excise duties have burdens spread 
more evenly amongst income deciles. In particular, beer and cigarette revenues have burdens 
that are spread evenly across the income distribution. 
Table 12 Distribution of tax shares, United Kingdoni, 1993- 1994 (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total sharea) Code 
Personal income tax 0 0 1 2 4 6 9 13 19 46 100 27.4 
Social insurance taxes (NI) 
- employee 0 0 1 3 5 9 13 16 23 29 100 5.1 
- employer 1 1 2 3 6 8 12 15 21 32 100 10.5 
Value-added tax 3 3 5 6 8 11 11 14 16 23 100 17.9 
Excise duties 3 4 6 8 9 11 12 13 16 18 100 12.7 
Council tax + rebate 3 4 6 8 10 11 12 14 15 17 100 4.0 
Corporation tax 2 3 5 5 6 8 9 12 13 37 100 7.6 
Business rates 3 4 6 7 8 11 11 13 16 21 100 6.6 
Customs dutiesb) 3 4 6 7 8 11 11 13 16 21 100 0.8 
Agricultural leviesc) 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 15 18 100 0.1 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
SIM 
SUR 
SIM 
SUR 
SIM 
SUR 
SUR 
Total all taxes 1 2 3 5 6 9 11 14 18 31 100 93.7 
Memorandum items 
Gross l~ousehold inc. 2 3 4 5 7 9 11 13 17 29 100 SUR 
Net household  in^.^) 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 13 16 27 100 SURfSIM 
Labour income 0 0 1 3 5 8 12 15 21 35 100 SUR 
Property income 1 2 3 2 2 3 8 10 14 55 100 SUR 
Dividend income 1 1 3 4 4 6 6 10 11 54 100 SUR 
Consumption 3 4 6 7 8 11 11 13 16 21 100 SUR 
a, Share (%) in tax mix (1992). 
b, Tax sliare corresponds with share of each decile in aggregate Iiousehold consumption. 
Tax share corresponds with share of each decile in aggregate food consumption. 
d, Incomc aftcr dcduction of all taxcs that can bc apportioncd to individual houscholds. 
22 The taxes not modelled are capital taxes such as capital gains tax and inheritance tax. The 
incidence assumptions underlying table 12 are as in A-F (subsection III.3), except for corporation tax, 
which is allocated 50% to consumers and 50% to dividend income, because of data problems. 
Chart 4 shows total taxes paid by households included in each decile as a proportion of 
aggregate gross income in that decile. On average, households pay 43% of their gross income 
to the Government in the included taxes. The distribution of payments is strongly progressive. 
The top decile pays several points more (48%) while households in lower deciles experience 
much lower average tax burdens. The sharply progressive nature of the UK tax system arises 
from the Income Tax system that exempts significant proportions of many households 
incomes and yet contributes more than a quarter of total goverment revenue. This very sharp 
increase in tax burdens displayed in Chart 4 would be slightly lessened if all taxes were 
included because the distribution of tax shares of the excluded taxes was found to be less 
progressive. 
Chart 7.4 Average tax burden, UK, 1993 
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Note: this chart includes business taxes, customs duties and agricultural levies for which average burdens could 
not be simulated. These taxes account for 15% of tax revenues. Averge burdens were therefore calculated using 
the distribution of the tax share, the distribution of gross income and the total tax revenue collected. Because the 
definilion o i  gross income used in the graph gives lower outcomes than administrative figures ([ur exariple 
because employer social security contributions are excluded), the impact of these taxes on the overall burden is 
overstated. 
IV.6 Comparison of tax distributions 
For three major national taxes we can compare the distribution of tax shares over deciles in 
all four EU member states: the personal income tax (table 13), employee social insurance 
contributions (table 14) and .the value-added tax (table 15). 
Table 13 compares distributions of the personal income tax. Given differences in the 
distribution of personal incomes, the tax base and rate structures, the similarity of income tax 
distributions over deciles in Germany and the Netherlands is striking indeed. The share in 
aggregate income tax revenue of Spanish households in deciles 8-10 is two points higher than 
it is in the two northern member states. The distribution found for the UK income tax is still 
substantially more progressive. Two reasons may be driving the apparent finding of a more 
progressive income tax structure, either a more unequal distribution of the income tax base 
itself, or the more progressive structure of UK income tax, due to the geiierous allowances 
against tax. As a result of these allowances, very few households in the bottom deciles have 
any income tax liability. 
Table 13 Distribution of personal income tax (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  Total 
Germany 1 2  3 5 6 7 9 1 2 1 7 3 9  100 
The Netherlands 1 2  3 4 5 7 9 1 2 1 7 3 9  100 
Spain 0 0 2 3 5 7 1 0 1 4  19 41 100 
United Kingdom 0 0 1 2  4 6 9 1 3 1 9 4 6  100 
Table 14 compares national distributions of employee social insurance contributions. For the 
UK, which finances its social security rather different from the other three Member States, we 
have selected National insurance contributions. In the Netherlands households in deciles 1-5 
bear 30% of this tax, as against 23% in Germany and 21% in Spain. On the other hand, in 
tlx-ee member states the share of the top decile exceeds 25%, to be compared with a share of 
only 17% in the Netherlands. As a result, the distribution of employee social iiisurance 
contributions is lcast progrcssivc in thc Ncthcrlands. 
Table 14 Distribution of employee social insurance contributions (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Total 
Germany 1 3  5 6 8 9 1 1 1 3 1 6  28 100 
The Netherlands 2 3 6 8 10 11 13 14 16 17") 100 
Spain 1 2  4 6 8 9 1 2 1 5 1 9  25 100 
United Kingdom'') 0 0 1 3  5 9 1 3 1 6 2 3  29 100 
a, Because several caps apply, the share of the top decile in the Netherlands is smaller than in the other three Member States. 
b, National insurance. 
Finally, table 15 compares distributions of the value-added tax. The tax shares of deciles are 
amazingly siniilar in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. The distribution of the VAT-burden 
is clearly most progressive in the UK, probably as a consequence of the rate structure in that 
Member State (a number of basic necessities are zero-taxed). 
Table 15 Distribution of value-added tax (% share) 
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Total 
Germany 4 5 5 9 8 10 12 13 14 19 100 
The Netherlands 4 5 6 8 9 10 12 13 15 19 100 
Spain 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 18 100 
United Kingdom 3 3 5 6 8 11 11 14 16 23 100 
V Concluding remarks 
Presently, the lax niix, lax rates and the tax base differ considerably from one EU member 
state to another. Nevertheless, the distributioii of tax burdens over income classes (each 
comprising of 10?6 of all houscholds) sccms to bc rcmarkably similar in the four EU iiieiiiber 
states - Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom - that are included in our 
analysis. Apparently, countries with higher nominal top rates offer their taxpayers more 
opportunities to reduce the lax base. Iii surn, tlie distribution of tax burdens tends to converge, 
even if tns-tn-c7:rlra rntio's nnd top rlitcs of tlic ycrsuil:ll ii~eomc lax diflcr soilsidcrably. 
One might liope that the results reported here will stimulate further research who really pays 
the taxes in EU member states and what the implications are for the relative position of each 
country, now that tlie 'tax theatre' in Europe is cliaracterised by increasiiig lax competition. 
Such research efforts might first extend our analysis from four to all fifteen member states. 
Next, it seems highly relevant to further analyse the contribution of major individual taxes to 
overall distributions of tax burdens, taking into account the role of personal exeptions, the 
structure of nominal rates and the erosion of tax bases. 
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